US urged to back UN Libya roadmap with action, not only

Libya's rival political and security blocs signed a UN-help agreement on August 30, aiming to resolve disputes that have blocked national elections since 2021. The United States has declared its bilateral diplomacy supports the UN roadmap, but the next two months will test that claim, according to an analysis from the Atlantic Council.

Declared support for UN-led political processes has been a consistent feature of international policy toward Libya for a decade. Aligning bilateral diplomacy behind those processes has proven more difficult. Over the past year, US engagements have included support for a unified national budget, joint military training, and mediation between the Dbeibah and Haftar factions. These efforts have drawn skepticism, with concerns that direct talks with rival power centers could undermine incentives to compromise through the UN-led process.

The 4+4 Agreement

The agreement emerged from talks known as the Smaller Convening, or 4+4, which brought together two representatives each from the Government of National Unity, Khalifa Haftar’s General Command, the House of Representatives (HOR), and the High State Council (HSC). Talks began in Rome on April 29 and continued through seven rounds in Tunisia before the signing in Tripoli.

The deal addresses two key milestones: reconstituting the board of the High National Elections Commission and resolving disputes over the legal and constitutional framework for elections. It uses Libya’s existing electoral laws as a basis while amending several disputed provisions.

The agreement commits parties to holding presidential and parliamentary elections within twenty-four months under a single executive authority. It does not, however, provide a mechanism for forming that unified authority. The HOR and HSC have until the end of September to approve the agreement. If they do not, signatories commit to pursuing its adoption through a broadly representative national mechanism and seeking international backing through the UN Security Council.

Initial reactions highlight the challenge ahead. Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah welcomed the agreement as a step toward elections, while Haftar similarly backed its outcome. HOR Speaker Aguila Saleh conditioned his support on the agreement’s consistency with Libya’s existing constitutional framework. HSC President Mohammed Takala declined to attend the signing, and the HSC later warned against "the imposition of arrangements from outside Libya’s institutional framework."

The Upcoming Deadlines

Neither the HOR nor the HSC has to reject the 4+4 agreement outright to derail the process before the end-of-September deadline. Either could decline to convene, fail to reach quorum, refer the text for further consideration, or condition its endorsement in ways that reopen settled issues. Libya has seen similar tactics before. In 2016, the HOR delivered a vote of no confidence against the Government of National Accord after repeated blockages.

The second deadline comes on October 31, when the UN Support Mission in Libya's (UNSMIL) current mandate expires. A twelve-month renewal would keep the mission operating, but duration alone would not make the renewed mandate fit for purpose. The agreement assigns UNSMIL specific work, including helping to build a follow-up framework and convening parties when they disagree. UNSMIL already has the authority to do this work, but it lacks explicit Security Council backing for this particular agreement and reporting that tracks its implementation.

The timing connects the two deadlines. If the HOR and HSC fail to endorse the agreement, its fallback provisions could push the issue to the Security Council just as members begin negotiating UNSMIL’s next mandate.

Recommended US Actions

The Atlantic Council analysis suggests three moves Washington should make to turn stated support into demonstrated alignment with the UN-led process.

First, the US should build consensus among international partners. As the endorsement deadline approaches, attention shifts to New York for the UN General Assembly. The United States has convened a Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) on Libya on the margins of the General Assembly in each of the past two years. Countries that participated in the 2025 SOM included Turkey, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The State Department should organize the SOM again this year but seek a joint statement from participants endorsing the 4+4 agreement and committing to support its implementation.

Second, the US mission in New York should work with the United Kingdom and other Security Council members to ensure the October mandate renewal endorses the roadmap and the agreement rather than simply welcoming them. Last October, Council members softened the language on the UN’s new Libya roadmap from "endorses" to "welcomes." The renewal should also spell out what the agreement asks of UNSMIL and require the secretary-general to report on progress against the deadlines.

Third, Washington should prepare targeted sanctions. A 2016 executive order permits the designation of individuals responsible for actions that obstruct Libya’s political transition. There is precedent: in 2016 the United States and the European Union each designated Libyan officials for obstructing a previous UN-brokered agreement. The Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control should work with the State Department to decide now what conduct would constitute sanctionable obstruction and prepare designation packages so Washington can act in weeks rather than months.

The 4+4 agreement does not guarantee elections will follow, but US action before the end of October could help move it toward implementation and give UNSMIL the political backing it needs.