Special Operations Command Rethinks

A senior U.S. Army special operations soldier argues that the military's focus on 'lethality' must not come at the expense of intellectual development. Writing under a pseudonym in War on the Rocks, the author states that future conflicts demand operators who understand policy and strategy, not just combat skills.

The article contends that warfare is brutal, but those who wage it should not be brutes. The author, an infantryman with nearly two decades of experience, suggests that recent anti-intellectual sentiment in the military may stem from frustration over protracted Middle East campaigns. True effectiveness, the piece asserts, requires combining natural combat intuition with broad knowledge and critical thought.

The Problem with 'Lethality'

Defining lethality is a frustrating and ultimately misguided pursuit, according to the source. The author describes it as a moving target, not a final goal or simple metric. It involves the continual refinement of methods to damage an adversary's war machine across various domains.

Is disabling a space-based early warning system a measure of lethality? Conversely, was lethality what enabled the massive 2021 evacuation from Afghanistan? The soldier writes that answering such questions requires education beyond the officer corps. Understanding policy, theory, and history should be seen as critical to employability as marksmanship or physical fitness.

The Enlisted Education Gap

Discussions about overhauling professional military education often omit the enlisted and non-commissioned officer corps. The author notes this is understandable, as formal education is more firmly embedded in the foundation of officership. A cultural artifact persists: 'Formal education is for officers and grunt work is for the enlisted.'

The soldier has lived this reality. While there is some value to the distinction, the author calls the disparity in intellectual expectations an artificial and harmful construct. A senior enlisted leader must understand policy and strategy to help subordinates apply their expertise effectively. Fixing this requires cultural change, not just more schooling.

Victims of Counterterrorism Success

The post-9/11 wars created an outsized role for special operations forces. Counterterrorism became a strategic pillar, catalyzing an 'unhealthy convergence' between special operations and conventional forces. Special operations took on conventional missions, while conventional forces performed some traditional special operations tasks.

These trends shaped the force in measurable ways. The author cites a nearly 50 percent increase in Special Operations Command manpower from 2001 to 2014. This did not reduce deployment rates or curb 'mission creep' across the military. The increased reliance on special operations during the Global War on Terror affected readiness, retention, and morale, fostering a narrow focus on direct action.

Special Operations Command's own 2020 comprehensive review identified this focus on mission accomplishment as a factor in degrading leader development and readiness. The author warns that as the military shifts to great power competition, some might learn the wrong lesson: that a good warfighter needs only direct-action skills. The article concludes by urging a deliberate uncoupling of special operations from conventional missions to adapt concepts of lethality for a new global environment.