US Defense Strategy in Indo-Pacific Faces Criticism

The US defense strategy in the Indo-Pacific, known as "flexible realism," has been criticized by US allies and partners for being unpredictable and lacking a clear commitment to the region.

Elbridge Colby, the US undersecretary of defense for policy, recently completed a tour of Southeast Asia where he promoted the Trump administration's new global defense strategy. In a public speech in Manila, Colby reiterated the turn in US alliance politics, emphasizing the need for "partners, not protectorates" and increased burden-sharing while continuing to bolster deterrence by denial against China.

However, Colby's approach has been met with skepticism by US allies and partners, who are seeking a sustained and predictable US commitment to the region. In a public speech, Colby described flexible realism as "contextual," meaning that the US response would depend on the situation. This approach has raised concerns that the US may not be committed to the region in the long term.

Another problem with flexible realism is that it demands substantially higher defense spending from US allies and partners. However, many nations, including the Philippines, are struggling to meet these expectations, and even wealthier states, such as Japan, are finding it difficult to reach the 2 percent of GDP on defense.

The omission of China from Colby's speech in Manila has also raised concerns. Colby reportedly never once uttered the word "China" while describing a defense strategy whose deterrence-by-denial concept is overwhelmingly designed around the Chinese military challenge. This has led to speculation that the Trump administration is prioritizing improving its personal relationship with Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping over a strong defense strategy.

The case of Australia is a good example of the challenges posed by flexible realism. Australia signed the AUKUS security pact with Britain and the US under the Biden administration in 2021, but the Trump administration's commitment to the deal has been called into question. In a virtual press conference, Colby declined to guarantee that Australia would receive its first Virginia-class submarine on schedule in 2032.

Flexible realism also prioritizes burden-sharing and fewer US commitments, which has led to a concentration of US military resources on the first island chain at the expense of sustained strategic attention to the Indian Ocean region. This has raised concerns that India will have to step up and do more on its own, rather than receiving support from the US.

The danger is that reducing attention to South Asia and the Indian Ocean could weaken India's hand precisely when the US should be strengthening it. Rather than forcing Beijing to divide its attention between its eastern and western flanks, Washington's narrower strategic focus could allow China to concentrate more heavily on the first island chain.

Finally, flexible realism suffers from an even more fundamental problem: It treats what is ultimately a geopolitical competition with China primarily as a military one. Washington's allies and partners want more than just security collaboration - they want diplomatic and economic support as well. On the economic side, Trump's trade tariffs have angered and frustrated US friends to the point that they are considering other options, including even closer trade and investment ties to China.

| Concept | Trump Administration | Biden Administration | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Prioritization | Shared interests over shared values | Shared values over shared interests | | Approach to China | Deterrence by denial | Preserving American primacy | | Defense spending | Demanding higher spending from allies | Prioritizing burden-sharing | | Focus | First island chain | Indian Ocean region |

The US defense strategy in the Indo-Pacific faces significant challenges, and it remains to be seen whether flexible realism will be able to address the concerns of US allies and partners.